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Summary The recent outbreak of human infection with a novel Swine-Origin
Inﬂuenza A (H1N1) virus is spreading rapidly through sustained human-to-human
transmission in multiple countries. Human-to-human transmission occurs by inhala-
tion of infectious droplets and droplet nuclei, and by direct contact, which is
facilitated by air and land travel and social gatherings. The most frequently reported
symptoms are fever, cough, myalgia, and sore throat. Detailed contact and travel
histories and knowledge of viral activity in community are essential for prompt
case detection by the health personnel. Real-time Reverse Transcriptase-Polymerase
Chain Reaction analysis of throat swabs or lower respiratory samples is a sensitive
means of diagnosis. Use of oral oseltamivir may be warranted for the treatment of
severe illness.
© 2009 King Saud Bin Abdulaziz University for Health Sciences. Published by Elsevier
Ltd. All rights reserved.
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Introduction
The recent outbreak of a novel Swine-Origin
Inﬂuenza A (H1N1) virus (S-OIV), which was ﬁrst
detected in April 2009 in California (USA) [1],
has now migrated to other parts of the Americas,
Europe, Australia, and Asia. S-OIV is a ‘triple-
reassortment’ inﬂuenza virus, containing genes
from human, swine, and avian inﬂuenza A viruses
[2]. As of 19 August 2009, 210 countries have
ofﬁcially reported over 182,166 cases of S-OIV
infection, including 1799 deaths reported by over
40 countries. The United States has reported the
majority of fatal cases: 7511 laboratory-conﬁrmed
human cases, including 477 deaths. The other
countries reporting laboratory-conﬁrmed cases are
Mexico, Canada, the United Kingdom, Australia,
Thailand, Chile, Spain, Panama, Brazil, India, etc.
[3]. On April 29, 2009 the World Health Organization
designated the outbreak a pandemic.
Clinical features
TransmissionTransmission of S-OIV is thought to occur in the
same way as seasonal ﬂu [4,5]. Human-to-human
transmission occurs by inhalation of large infec-
tious droplets and droplet nuclei as well as by
a
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irect contact with secretions or aerosols [6]. Pos-
ibly, swine-to-human transmission may occur [7].
t present, there is no evidence of spread of infec-
ion by eating pork, or through water. Judging the
andemic potential of S-OIV is difﬁcult with limited
ata, though recent epidemiological analyses sug-
est its transmissibility is substantially higher than
hat of seasonal ﬂu, and comparable with previous
nﬂuenza pandemics [8].
nfectious period
ata regarding the estimated duration of S-OIV
hedding by patients is limited and based upon
easonal inﬂuenza virus infection. In general, per-
ons with S-OIV infection should be considered
otentially infectious from 1 day before to 7
ays following illness onset or until symptoms
esolve. Children, patients with lower respiratory
ract infections, elderly and immunocompromised
atients might be infectious for up to 10 days
r longer [9,10]. This is due to low cytotoxic T-
ymphocyte activity which is responsible for viral
learance and recovery from infection [11]. Cyto-
oxic T-lymphocyte activity declines in the elderly
s well as in immunocompromised individuals so
hat viral shedding could persist longer in them
12]. However, studies of viral shedding to deﬁne
he infectious period of S-OIV are needed. The
otential for persons with asymptomatic infection
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o be the source of infection to others is unknown
ut should be investigated.
ncubation period
he precise incubation period has not been estab-
ished for S-OIV infection, it could range from 1
o 7 days, and most likely from 1 to 4 days [13].
his is comparable to the incubation period of avian
nﬂuenza A (H5N1) which is 1—8 days [14], but
onger than that of seasonal human inﬂuenza (1—4
ays) [15].
ymptoms
ovel S-OIV Investigation Team of Centers for Dis-
ase Control and Prevention, United States of
merica report a series of 642 cases from United
tates identiﬁed by enhanced surveillance and
onﬁrmed by real-time RT-PCR, viral culture, or
oth. The most frequently reported symptoms in
his series are fever (94%), cough (92%), and sore
hroat (66%); 25% of patients report diarrhoea,
nd a further 25% report vomiting [16]. Myal-
ia and joint pains may also be present. Nine
ercent of patients in this series required hospi-
alization. Of 22 hospitalized patients, 8 required
dmission to an intensive care unit, 4 had respi-
atory failure, and two expired. Eleven patients
50% of hospitalized patients in this series) had
adiologically conﬁrmed pneumonia, including one
atient each of pneumomediastinum, necrotizing
neumonia, and empyema. Radiographic changes
n patents with pneumonia include diffuse, multifo-
al, or patchy inﬁltrates, interstitial inﬁltrates, and
egmental or lobular consolidation with air bron-
hograms [17,18].
omplications
eople of any age with certain chronic medical con-
itions, children less than 5 years, persons 65 or
lder, and pregnant women might be at increased
isk for complications from S-OIV infection [19].
omplications like pneumonia and dehydration
ave required hospitalization in approximately
—5% of conﬁrmed cases in the United States
nd 5—6% in Mexico [5,18]. Few bacterial infec-
ions have been detected in patients with S-OIV;
hese include empyema, necrotizing pneumonia,
s well as ventilator-associated pneumonia due to
cinetobacter baumannii, Achromobacter xylosox-
dans, methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus,
nd Escherichia coli. Patients with ventilator-
ssociated pneumonia have serious risk of death
up to 58%) mainly due to multi-organ failure [18].
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eurological complications in form of seizures is
eported in four children in Texas with S-OIV devel-
ped, though all four recovered fully [20].
There are few characteristics of this pandemic
hich appear unusual compared with a typical
nﬂuenza seasonal outbreak. First, the percentage
f patients requiring hospitalization (2—6%) appears
o be higher than would be expected during a typ-
cal inﬂuenza season (0.4—1%) [21]. Second, the
eed for hospitalisations for S-OIV infection has
een particularly high among persons aged between
he ages of 1.5 and 59 years [22], which is dif-
erent than that of seasonal inﬂuenza, in which
evere infection requiring hospitalizations typically
ccurs in children aged less than 1 year and adults
ged more than 65 years [21]. Why only few elderly
ndividuals have been affected during the current
andemic is intriguing. This may be due to some
egree of preexisting immunity in older individu-
ls against antigenically similar inﬂuenza viruses
hat circulated prior to 1957 [23]. Of ﬁve pregnant
omen requiring hospitalization for S-OIV infec-
ion, one had spontaneous abortion (at 13 weeks of
estation) and one developed premature rupture of
embranes (at 35 weeks of gestation) [19].
ortality
s of August 19, 2009, there have been 182,166
aboratory-conﬁrmed cases of S-OIV worldwide,
ncluding 1799 deaths (0.98%) [3]. Most of the
eaths are reported by the Americas (1579 deaths).
sian countries have reported 106 deaths. Europe
nd Africa have reported fewer deaths.
Most of the deaths are related to respiratory
ailure resulting from severe pneumonia and acute
espiratory distress syndrome [24]. Renal or multi-
rgan failure occurs in 24% cases. In Mexico,
ost of the deaths (54%) occurred in previously
ealthy individuals between the ages of 20 and 59
24]. In other parts of world, most of the deaths
ccurred in individuals with underlying health prob-
ems [25,26]. One death in Mexico and one death
n the US occurred in women who were in the
hird trimester of pregnancy when they became ill
19,24].
The number of deaths in US was highest among
eople 25—49 years of age (39%), followed by peo-
le 50—64 year of age (25%) and people 5—24 year of
ge (16%) [27]. This pattern is different from what
s seen in seasonal inﬂuenza, where an estimated
0% of inﬂuenza-related deaths occur in people 65
ears of age and older [21].
At present, the data seem to imply that this new
irus is relatively mild, with case fatality ratios
round 1%, similar to or less than that seen for
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seasonal inﬂuenza [28]. However, simple interpre-
tations of these crude ﬁgures at the beginning of a
pandemic may be misleading in terms of assessing
severity. This may occur due to bias in estimates
of the case fatality ratio (with time, efforts may
become more focused on the most severe cases,
leading to an overestimation of the case fatality
ratio) and from the inevitable delay between symp-
tom onset and death, which in the early phase of
the epidemic can lead to underestimation of the
case fatality ratio if it is not adjusted for [29].
Management
Case detection
The possibility of S-OIV infection should be consid-
ered in all patients with severe acute respiratory
illness in countries or territories with known S-OIV.
Clinicians should consult their individual health
ministries for information about incidence of
the disease in their countries and guidelines for
case detection. Recommendations can also be
found at the World health organization website
(http://www.who.int/csr/resources/publications/
swineﬂu/interim guidance/en/index.html) and the
United States Centers for Disease Control and Pre-
vention website (http://www.cdc.gov/swineﬂu).
As per United States Centers for Disease Control
and Prevention guidelines [13], testing for S-OIV
should be considered in individuals with an acute
febrile respiratory illness (a measured tempera-
ture of 37.8 ◦C or higher and recent onset of at
least one of the following: rhinorrhea, nasal conges-
tion, sore throat, or cough) or sepsis-like syndrome.
Priority for testing should be given to those who
require hospitalization and those who are at high
risk for severe complications. In addition, patients
having inﬂuenza-like illness developing within 7
days of close contact with a person who is a
conﬁrmed case of S-OIV infection, or who has trav-
elled to areas with known S-OIV activity in past 7
days, the possibility of S-OIV warrants consideration
[30].
Not all individuals with suspected S-OIV infection
need to have the diagnosis conﬁrmed, particularly if
the illness is mild [13]. Recommendations on whom
to test may differ by state or country and clinicians
should be aware of them. For countries with limited
laboratory capacity, or limited access to laboratory
capacity, World Health Organization recommends
that they should aim to test a number of samples
per week in order to verify that disease activity is
still largely due to S-OIV [30].
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pecimen collection
o test for S-OIV, upper respiratory specimens, such
s a nasopharyngeal swab or aspirate, nasal wash,
r tracheal aspirate should be collected with appro-
riate personal protective precaution. Specimens
hould be sent to the nearest laboratory which has
een equipped to test S-OIV. Swabs with a syn-
hetic tip (e.g., polyester or Dacron) and aluminum
r plastic shaft should be used. Swabs with cotton
ips and wooden shafts are not recommended. The
ollection vial in which the swab is placed should
ontain 1—3mL of viral transport media. Specimens
hould be placed in viral transport media and placed
n ice (4 ◦C) or refrigerated immediately for trans-
ortation to the laboratory. Once the samples arrive
n the laboratory, they should be stored either in
refrigerator at 4 ◦C or in a −70 ◦C freezer. If a
70 ◦C freezer is not available, they should be kept
efrigerated, preferably for ≤1 week. Specimens
hould be shipped on dry ice to the state pub-
ic health laboratory in clearly labeled containers
nd should include all information requested by the
tate health laboratory [13,30].
irus detection
eal-time Reverse Transcriptase-Polymerase
hain Reaction (RT-PCR)
he recommended test to conﬁrm the diagnosis of
-OIV is real-time RT-PCR for inﬂuenza A, B, H1,
nd H3 [13,30]. The strain of H1N1 inﬂuenza A virus
ssociated with the 2009 pandemic tests positive
or inﬂuenza A and negative for H1 and H3 by real-
ime RT-PCR.
iral culture
virus culture is diagnostic, but culture is usually
oo slow to help guide clinical management. A neg-
tive viral culture does not exclude pandemic S-OIV
nfection [13,31].
apid antigen tests
linicians may consider using rapid inﬂuenza anti-
en tests as part of rapid evaluation of patients
uspected of having S-OIV infection, but results
hould conﬁrmed by real-time Reverse Transcrip-
ase (RT)-PCR or culture [32]. The sensitivity
nd speciﬁcity of rapid antigen testing for S-OIV
nfection have not been established. Based on
imited data, the sensitivity of rapid antigen test-
ng for detecting S-OIV is probably similar to, or
ower than, the sensitivity for detecting seasonal
nﬂuenza [33]. A negative rapid inﬂuenza test does
ot exclude infection [32].
SI
A
b
h
d
h
C
A
a
(
(
a
w
(
a
w
m
(
H
M
s
c
w
c
c
m
c
d
i
i
A
S
n
w
e
a
O
O
l
l
O
a
s
t
v
i
f
d
t
r
r
f
p
(
a
l
n
e
s
a
s
Z
Z
p
1
a
i
n
2
o
t
t
1
(
t
pwine ﬂu
mmunoﬂuorescent antibody testing
patient with a positive Immunoﬂuorescent anti-
ody testing may be considered a probable case if
e or she meets the other criteria. A negative test
oes not exclude S-OIV infection since these tests
ave unclear sensitivity to detect this virus [34].
ase deﬁnition [13]
suspected case of S-OIV infection is deﬁned
s a person with acute febrile respiratory illness
fever = 37.8 ◦C) with onset:
(i) within 7 days of close contact with a person
who is a conﬁrmed case of S-OIV infection, or
(ii) within 7 days of travel to areas where there
are one or more conﬁrmed S-OIV cases, or
iii) resides in a community where there are one or
more conﬁrmed swine inﬂuenza cases.
A probable case of S-OIV infection is deﬁned as
person with an acute febrile respiratory illness
ho:
(i) is positive for inﬂuenza A, but unsubtypable for
H1 and H3 by inﬂuenza RT-PCR or reagents used
to detect seasonal inﬂuenza virus infection, or
(ii) is positive for inﬂuenza A by an inﬂuenza rapid
test or an inﬂuenza immunoﬂuorescence assay
plus meets criteria for a suspected case, or
iii) individual with a clinically compatible illness
who died of an unexplained acute respiratory
illness who is considered to be epidemiologi-
cally linked to a probable or conﬁrmed case.
A conﬁrmed case of S-OIV infection is deﬁned
s a person with an acute febrile respiratory illness
ith laboratory-conﬁrmed S-OIV infection by one or
ore of the following tests:
(i) Real-time RT-PCR
(ii) Viral culture
iii) Four-fold rise in S-OIV speciﬁc neutralizing
antibodies.
ospitalization
ost cases of S-OIV infection tend to be mild and
elf-limited and do not require visit to a health
are provider or hospitalization [16]. Patients
ith severe illness and those at high risk for
omplications from inﬂuenza should seek medical
are. Those with severe illness and complications
ay require prolong hospitalization, and in some
ases ventilatory support [5,18]. If patients are
ischarged early, both the patients and their fam-
lies require education on personal hygiene and
nfection-control measures.
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ntiviral agents
-OIV is susceptible to oseltamivir and zanamivir,
euraminidase inhibitor antiviral medications,
hich target the early phase of the infection. How-
ver, this strain is resistant to adamantanes, such
s amantadine and rimantadine [35].
seltamivir
seltamivir is a prodrug that is hydrolyzed by the
iver to its active metabolite, oseltamivir carboxy-
ate, with an elimination half-life of about 6—10 h.
seltamivir is a neuraminidase inhibitor, serving as
competitive inhibitor of sialic acid, found on the
urface proteins of normal host cells. By blocking
he activity of the neuraminidase, oseltamivir pre-
ents new viral particles from being released by
nfected cells [36]. The therapeutic oral dosage
or S-OIV infection in adults is 75mg taken twice
aily for 5 days, starting within 48 h of the ini-
ial symptoms to capture the early phase of viral
eplication (Table 1). For chemoprophylaxis, the
ecommended dosage is 75mg taken once daily
or 10 days after exposure. Therapeutic and pro-
hylactic dosing schedules for children are similar
about 2mg/kg twice a day for 5 days for treatment,
nd 2mg/kg once a day for 10 days for prophy-
axis) [13]. Adverse effects of oseltamivir includes
ausea, vomiting and transient neuropsychiatric
vents (self-injury or delirium). These dangerous
ide effects occur more commonly in children and
dolescents [37]. Nausea and vomiting might be less
evere if oseltamivir is taken with food.
anamivir
anamivir is administered by inhalation with a dry
owder inhaler. The bioavailability of the drug is
0—20% by inhalation, compared with 2% by oral
dministration. About 90% of the absorbed dose
s excreted unchanged in the urine. The elimi-
ation half-life in serum of zanamivir is about
—5 h [38]. The mechanism of action is similar to
seltamivir. The therapeutic dose is 10mg inhaled
wice daily for 5 days starting within 48 h of the ini-
ial symptoms. For chemoprophylaxis, the dose is
0mg inhaled once daily for 10 days after exposure
Table 1). The recommended doses for children are
he same. Because zanamivir therapy requires the
atient to voluntarily inhale through the device,
seltamivir may be preferred over zanamivir for
oung children. Zanamivir is not recommended for
reatment for patients with chronic airway disease
r asthma as it can induce bronchospasm [38].
162 M. Sinha
Table 1 Antiviral medication dosing recommendations for treatment or chemoprophylaxis of S-OIV infection.
Agent, group Treatment Chemoprophylaxis
Oseltamivir
Adults 75mg capsule twice daily
for 5 days
75mg capsule once daily
Children ≥12 months 15 kg or less 60mg per day divided into
2 doses
30mg once daily
15—23 kg 90mg per day divided into
2 doses
45mg once daily
24—40 kg 120mg per day divided
into 2 doses
60mg once daily
>40 kg 150mg per day divided
into 2 doses
75mg once daily
Zanamivir
Adults Two 5mg inhalations
(10mg total) twice daily
Two 5mg inhalations
(10mg total) once daily
Children Two 5mg inhalations
(10mg total) twice daily
ge,
Two 5mg inhalations
(10mg total) once daily
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Recommendations
During the current pandemic, patients with mild
illness do not require antiviral agents unless they
have risk factors for complications [13]. However,
the decision of whether to initiate antiviral therapy
for each patient should be based upon the clin-
ician’s judgment, especially in areas with limited
antiviral availability. Clinicians should consult with
their ministries of health and/or the World Health
Organization for speciﬁc recommendations.
The United States Centers for Disease Control
and Prevention has released guidelines for the use
of antivirals for patients with conﬁrmed or sus-
pected S-OIV infection and close contacts which are
as follows [13].
Adults. Antiviral therapy should be started in all
adult hospitalized patients with conﬁrmed, proba-
ble, or suspected patients and in those at increased
risk for complications. Therapy should be started
as soon as possible, since evidence of beneﬁt is
strongest when treatment is started within 48 h of
illness onset. Some studies of hospitalized patients
have demonstrated beneﬁt even when therapy for
seasonal inﬂuenza is started >48 h after onset of
illness [5,17,18]. In patients with severe infection,
therapy can be started even past 48 h of symptoms.
Recommendations for use of antivirals may change
as data on antiviral effectiveness, clinical spectrum
of illness, adverse events from antiviral use, and
antiviral susceptibility data become available.
Pregnancy. Oseltamivir and zanamivir are Preg-
nancy Category C drugs, reﬂecting that clinical
studies have not been done to assess the safety
of their use during pregnancy [13,35]. Because of
s
u
i7 years or older) (age, 5 years or older)
ore data about its safety in pregnancy, the use
f oseltamaivir is preferred over zanamavir dur-
ng pregnancy. Both oseltamivir and zanamivir are
onsidered to be compatible with breastfeeding
39]. Pregnant women who meet case deﬁnitions for
onﬁrmed, probable, or suspected S-OIV infection
hould receive antiviral therapy with oseltamivir,
ince the potential beneﬁt outweighs the theoreti-
al risk to the fetus. Treatment should be initiated
s early as possible.
In addition to antiviral therapy, use of
cetaminophen is important when fever is present,
ince hyperthermia during the ﬁrst trimester has
een associated with neural tube defects and other
irth defects [40]. In addition, fever during labor is
risk factor for neonatal seizures, encephalopathy,
erebral palsy, and neonatal death [41].
hildren. All hospitalized children with con-
rmed, probable, or suspected S-OIV infection and
hose at higher risk of complications should receive
ntiviral agents. In addition, all children younger
han 5 years of age, particularly those less than 2
ears of age, are at increased risk for complications
f inﬂuenza. Either oseltamivir or zanamivir can be
iven in children, when indicated, during the cur-
ent pandemic [13]. For children less than 1 year
f age, oseltamivir is the recommended drug. Chil-
ren taking oseltamivir should be closely observed
or serious neuropsychiatric events as describedChildren who may have inﬂuenza infection
hould not take aspirin or aspirin-containing prod-
cts, such as bismuth subsalicyclate due to the
ncreased risk of Reye syndrome [42].
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ost-exposure chemoprophylaxis
ost-exposure chemoprophylaxis should be consid-
red for both close contacts of cases and health
are personnel who have had a recognized, unpro-
ected close contact exposure to a conﬁrmed,
robable or suspected case during the infectious
eriod of that patient. Close contact is deﬁned as
erson who has cared for or lived with a person who
s a conﬁrmed, probable or suspected case of S-OIV
nfection, or having been to a setting where there
as a high likelihood of contact with respiratory
roplets and/or body ﬂuids of such a patient. Exam-
les of close contact include kissing or embracing,
haring eating or drinking utensils, physical exami-
ation, or any other contact between persons likely
o result in exposure to respiratory droplets. Close
ontact typically does not include activities such as
alking by an infected person or sitting across from
symptomatic patient in a waiting room or ofﬁce
43].
For antiviral chemoprophylaxis of S-OIV infec-
ion, either oseltamivir or zanamivir can be given
Table 1). Antiviral post-exposure chemoprophy-
axis should be given for 10 days after the last
nown exposure to S-OIV.
ntiviral resistance
s with other antiviral agents, resistance to
he agent is expected with widespread use of
seltamivir and zanamivir. At least ﬁve isolates
f S-OIV with resistance to oseltamivir have been
etected from patients in Denmark, Japan, Hong
ong, and Canada [44,45]. Mutations conferring
esistance are single amino acid residue substitu-
ions (His274Tyr) in the neuraminidase enzyme [46].
However, in locations where oseltamivir-
esistant virus is circulating, zanamivir may be
iven. In such a setting, for patients who are
nable to take zanamivir, rimantadine, amantadine
r ribavarine may be added to oseltamivir [47].
ne recent study has reported reduced zanamivir
usceptibility in nine inﬂuenza A (H1N1) viruses iso-
ated between 2006 and early 2008 from Australasia
nd South East Asia which contained a previously
ndescribed Gln136Lys (Q136K) neuraminidase
utation [48].
dditional therapy
dditional therapy such as antibiotics should be
sed at the discretion of the clinicians if the
atient’s clinical condition warrants. Patients with
andemic S-OIV infection who develop pneumonia
hould be treated empirically for community-
cquired pneumonia [49]. In patients with severe
H
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p163
ommunity-acquired pneumonia requiring inten-
ive care unit admission who also have either necro-
izing/cavitary inﬁltrates or empyema, pathogens
ike methicillin-resistant S. aureus (MRSA), A. bau-
annii, A. xylosoxidans and E. coli infection should
e suspected and treated aggressively as mortality
ay be high among them [18].
Role of corticosteroids in the management of
everely ill patients with novel S-OIV infection
s unclear, and routine corticosteroid use is not
ecommended. Low doses of corticosteroids may
e considered for patients in septic shock who
equire vasopressors and have suspected adrenal
nsufﬁciency. Prolonged use of or high dose corti-
osteroids can result in serious adverse events in
nﬂuenza virus-infected patients, including oppor-
unistic infection and possibly prolonged viral
eplication [50].
revention
mmunization
accines are the most powerful public health tool
or control of inﬂuenza. Seasonal inﬂuenza vaccines
re not expected to provide protection against
-OIV infection because this novel strain hemagglu-
inin is different from seasonal inﬂuenza A (H1N1)
51]. Around 20 vaccine manufacturers are prepar-
ng to make S-OIV vaccine, and it is expected to
e available as early as September 2009 [52]. As
accines available initially will not be sufﬁcient, a
tep-wise approach to vaccinate particular groups
ay be considered. The Strategic Advisory Group of
xperts of the World Health Organization suggested
he following groups for consideration, noting that
ountries need to determine their order of prior-
ty based on country-speciﬁc conditions: healthcare
roviders; pregnant women; those aged above 6
onths with one of several chronic medical condi-
ions; healthy young adults of 15—49 years of age;
ealthy children; healthy adults of 50—64 years of
ge; and healthy adults of 65 years of age and
bove. Since the S-OIV vaccine is not intended to
eplace the seasonal ﬂu vaccine, individuals should
e encouraged to get their seasonal ﬂu vaccine
long with it [52].
ousehold and close contactsousehold contacts of persons with conﬁrmed cases
f S-OIV should receive post-exposure prophylaxis
s described above. Contacts of a patient with
roven or suspected virus should monitor their tem-
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perature and symptoms. Medical attention should
be sought if they have fever greater than 37.8 ◦C
plus one or more of the following: rhinorrhea or
nasal congestion; sore throat; cough. All people
of patient’s family, including patient, should cover
their cough and wash hands often. People with
inﬂuenza-like illness should remain at home until
at least 24 h after they are free of fever (37.8 ◦C),
or signs of a fever without the use of fever-reducing
medications [53]. In community and home settings,
the use of facemasks and respirators are not rec-
ommended, except for persons at increased risk of
severe illness from inﬂuenza. However, healthcare
providers caring for persons with conﬁrmed, prob-
able or suspected S-OIV infection should wear N-95
respirator [54].
Travel
People with symptoms of ﬂu should not leave home
or travel. If symptoms develop during ﬂight or pub-
lic transport vehicle, the person with illness should
protect others by wearing a facemask if tolera-
ble to reduce the number of droplets coughed or
sneezed into the air or use a tissue to cover their
nose and mouth when coughing or sneezing. The
person with illness should sit at least 6 feet apart
from others without compromising ﬂight safety. If
the person with illness is travelling to a different
country, the captain of the plane should report the
illness to quarantine ofﬁcials in the jurisdiction of
the airport where the plane is expected to land
prior to arrival or as soon as illness is noted. Quar-
antine ofﬁcials will work with the airline and local
and state health departments to assist with medical
transportation of the patient upon arrival, disease
control and containment measures, passenger and
crew notiﬁcation and surveillance activities, and
airline disinfection procedures [55].
Public gathering
In public gatherings, it is difﬁcult to maintain phys-
ical distance between people. As a result, there
may be increased risk for spread of S-OIV. Such
gatherings can include school or college classes,
church services, sporting events, concerts, social
and cultural celebrations, weddings, conferences,
and other similar activities attended by relatively
large groups of people. It is recommended that per-
sons with inﬂuenza-like illness should avoid such
gatherings and stay at home for 7 days after the
onset of illness or at least 24 h after symptoms have
resolved, whichever is longer [56]. Persons who are
at high risk of complications from S-OIV infection
should consider staying away from public gather-
t
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ngs in communities where S-OIV is circulating. All
ersons should be reminded to use appropriate res-
iratory and hand hygiene precautions.
Further, large public gatherings offer a good
pportunity for public health ofﬁcials and event
rganizers to deliver key educational messages
bout measures attendees can take to help reduce
he spread of S-OIV infection. Other measures like
and washing facilities with soap and running water,
and sanitizer, tissues, and on-site medical assess-
ent can be provided by event organizers to help
educe the risk for infection. [57].
School closures are not universally recom-
ended due to ethical concerns, though policies
ay vary in different countries [58]. However, it
s pertinent to mention that the current pandemic
pread to United States from Mexico in March—April
009 after some students of a New York school con-
racted S-OIV infection during a visit to Mexico over
pring break [1].
lobal efforts
orld Health Organization (WHO) is actively mon-
toring the progress of the pandemic through
onsultations with its Regional Ofﬁces and mem-
er states. WHO has teamed up with agencies
ike United States Centers for Disease Control
nd Prevention, the Pan-American Health Orga-
ization/(PAHO/WHO), Global Outbreak Alert and
esponse Network, European Centre for Disease
revention and Control, and the China Centre
or Disease Prevention and Control to better
nderstand the outbreak, including clinical illness
everity and transmission patterns, and to facilitate
he production and distribution of S-OIV vaccine.
onclusions
lthough it has been just over four month since
he ﬁrst few cases were identiﬁed, the outbreak
f human infection with a novel S-OIV is spread-
ng rapidly through sustained human-to-human
ransmission in multiple countries. The spread of
nfection has been facilitated by air and land travel
nd social gatherings. The better understanding of
outes of transmission, clinical features, pathogen-
sis, and perhaps, response to treatment is required
o check the spread of infection. Detailed contact
nd travel histories and knowledge of viral activ-
ty in community are essential for prompt case
etection by the health personnel. Real-time RT-
CR analysis of throat swabs or lower respiratory
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amples may offer sensitive means of diagnosis.
se of oral oseltamivir may be warranted for the
reatment of severe illness. Above all, there is an
rgent need for global coordination in clinical and
pidemiologic research to control this outbreak.
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